

**SECRET**Country: BoliviaDebrief Report by: Donn W. YoderDuty Assignments: US Army Attache for  
11 months and Defense  
Attache for 14 monthsDate of Report: 20 July 1967**I. (S) CAUSATIVE FACTORS OF THE INSURGENCY IN COUNTRY OR AREA:**

Until March of 1967 there was no known insurgency in Bolivia. However, on March 23rd a Bolivian Army patrol of the 4th Division was ambushed in the area of NANCANUAZU (1930S/6340W) while investigating a report that there were possibly guerrillas in the area. This action resulted in 7 KIA, 6 WIA and 14 PW's whom were later released. This was the beginning of guerrilla warfare in Bolivia and it is still in progress at this moment. To this date the total casualties of Bolivian Forces are as follows: KIA 34 (6 officers, 4 NCO's, 20 EM, 3 civilians and 1 Guardia (Policeman); WIA 27; and although several prisoners were taken by the guerrillas they have all been released unharmed. The Bolivian Army has reported many guerrillas killed and wounded, however, the only one confirmed so far is one of the guerrilla leaders Moises GUEVARA Rodriguez, a Bolivian, whose corpse was pictured in the local paper Presencia to day, 20 July. He was killed by a Bolivian Army patrol in the area of M. DORADO (1927S/6348W) on 11 July 1967. The only other tangible evidence so far provided by the Bolivian Army is the capture of three so-called guerrillas: Jules Regis DEBRAY, from France; Carlos Alberto BUSTOS, from Argentina; and George Andrew ROTH, an Englishman from Chile. These three men claim to be newspaper reporters. ROTH has been released but is still required to stay in Bolivia; however, the Bolivians plan to try by military tribunal both DEBRAY and BUSTOS as participants in guerrilla warfare against the government of Bolivia.

It appears evident that the guerrilla group in Bolivia is professionally led by Cuban oriented guerrillas from Cuba, Argentina and other Latin American countries, and includes a substantial number of Bolivians trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba and other communist countries. USARMA estimates the guerrillas to total no more than 100 at the present time, and fortunately this

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guerrilla activity in Bolivia was discovered prior to the phase of recruitment. This group which operates at times in smaller groups is armed with modern automatic weapons and has been able to consistently outmaneuver and outsmart the Bolivian Army units.

The Communists have probably chosen Bolivia as another country in which to begin insurgency because Bolivia is a poor country with a large portion of the population illiterate Indians who can be easily influenced. Bolivia also is a large country with tremendous areas of sparsely populated jungles which are ideal for guerrilla training. ARMA believes that the Cuban-led guerrillas had planned to establish a base and train a large force prior to beginning operations; however, their plans were changed when they were inadvertently discovered by a Bolivian Army patrol in March. An effective guerrilla base in Bolivia would give the Communists a base of operation in the heart of South America from which they could operate in all directions and not just against Bolivia. Proof of their effect upon the Bolivian economy is already evident as much of the limited money planned for social and economic development in Bolivia for 1967 has had to be diverted to support the efforts of the Armed Forces against the guerrillas.

Life in Bolivia has been economically and socially better each year since the Junta took over on 4 November 1964, and the Armed Forces turned over to Barrientos and the people a constitutional government and returned to the barracks on 6 August 1966 as heroes in the eyes of the people. The Barrientos government has been reasonably stable and continued progress was being made until the recent guerrilla situation began to adversely affect the morale of the people, the Armed Forces, and the economy.

It is true that the guerrilla activities during 1967 have made the Armed Forces look bad and have put heavy pressure on the Barrientos government because it has been forced to divert large sums of money which had been programmed for use to raise the economic standards of Bolivia to support the Armed Forces. The recent mine crisis has also caused additional economic problems for the Barrientos government because the mines are the primary source of revenue for the Bolivian government, and when they are

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not operating the GOB is losing money.

There is no strong political party in Bolivia, but the small communist and left out parties are always ready to seize an opportunity to gain popularity with the malcontents and to harass the current government in every way possible. Consequently, we have recently had student manifestations, strikes in the mines, etc., led by communist labor leaders, and politically left out agitators.

Up to the present time there is no indication that the guerrilla movement in the jungle areas has any ties with the mine crisis and student and labor demonstrations.

## II. (S) THE INSURGENT:

The guerrillas are well-organized and apparently Cuban led. They are a well-trained group of hard corps professionals who are well led and who have the necessary communications to control their operations. Their tactics are sound and they set up ambushes in dense jungles which have proven consistently effective especially against the now, poorly trained and terribly scared Bolivian soldiers. They have apparently been in the CAMIRI-VALLE GRANDE area for a long time and know this area like a book; therefore, they are able to outmaneuver and break contact with the Bolivian Army Forces at will. All reports indicate that they are armed primarily with automatic weapons, have plenty of ammunition and have set up many different arms caches and camp sites so that they can rapidly move from one location to another and confuse the Bolivian Army as to their whereabouts and their size.

Transportation is one of their problems, but so far whenever they have needed transportation they have seized it from the local populace with no apparent problems.

Their recent move into SAMAIPIATA (18005/0353H) to buy drugs, clothes and food is an indication that logistically they are beginning to feel the constant, although not very effective, pressure of the Bolivian Army pursuit which has caused them to be continuously on the move.

There are indications that they have radios to control operations within the guerrilla area, and it has also been reported, but unconfirmed,

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that they have radio contact with Havana.

ARMA believes this is definitely a communist led and communist supported effort from outside of Bolivia. They have plenty of money as evidenced by their numerous purchases for prices far above regular market prices.

There are no indications of support for the guerrilla movement within the local populace and political parties. In fact, so far, the people of Bolivia seem to be definitely on the side of the government and the Armed Forces.

The guerrilla intelligence capability has made the Bolivian Army look like a beginner as they are able to move at will undetected in all parts of the area. Almost every contact has been initiated as an ambush by the guerrillas and they have broken contact and disappeared whenever they desired.

The other insurgent activity in Bolivia recently by the miners and the teachers, students and factory workers in the opinion of ARMA, have not been directly related to the guerrilla activity. Instead, it is my opinion that these malcontents urged by left out political parties, union leaders, dissatisfied teachers and communistic paid professional students have seized this opportunity to make life difficult for the Barrientos government. This has been a way of life in Bolivia for many years.

Barrientos, with full backing of the Armed Forces, recently ordered troops into the HUANCHI and CATAVI-SICLO XX mines to rid them of subversive leaders and to restore order in the mines. This was accomplished with a minimum of bloodshed and both of the mines are now at work. However, it can be expected that the troops will continue to occupy the mine areas concerned until the government is satisfied that the current problems have been resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned. Then the Army troops will be withdrawn and only the Guardia Nacional (Police) units will remain in the mining areas to maintain law and order.

### III. (9) LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTIONS:

A. Bolivia is sharing information on a limited scale with neighboring countries concerning the current guerrilla situation and has asked for

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support in arms and ammunition from Argentina, Peru, Brazil and the United States. So far, they have received support in arms and ammunition solely from the United States and Argentina plus 3,000 field rations from Peru.

B. The Bolivian Armed Forces is the only organized force to counter-act insurgency. However, the National Guard on a limited scale has helped in the cities and in the mine areas; also some Camposinos have volunteered to assist the government in the guerrilla area, but their value is minimal. The National Department of Criminal Investigation (DNIC) also has agents operating throughout the country and in the guerrilla area to help gather intelligence concerning counter-insurgency in Bolivia which it coordinates with the Armed Forces. During the past year there has been an improvement in the coordination between the DNIC and the Guardia Nacional under the Minister of Government and the Armed Forces concerning the exchange of intelligence, however, the over all capability of both organizations for producing intelligence is poor.

The National Guard is poorly trained and equipped and has only a minimal capability of maintaining law and order within the cities as the average city policeman is armed only with a club or night stick. Recently an agreement was signed with the United States to again provide training and support for the Bolivian Police under the Public Safety Program and this should lead ultimately to a more efficient National Police force; however, at present they are badly in need of training, arms, communications equipment and transportation.

## C. FORCES:

1. Military - The tactics used to combat insurgency in the mining areas have been normal infantry tactics as the altiplano is open, practically without trees, vegetation is minimal, and the rolling hills in the mining areas are perfect for standard infantry tactics. Visibility is also good for great distances and makes the M-1 rifle an effective weapon in the hands of a good soldier. Consequently, the Bolivian MAP supported units although far below the ability of U.S. units have been and are fully capable of handling the poorly armed and ineffectively led miners.

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The tactics originally used by the military forces against the guerrillas in Bolivia were terrible. In those dense jungles where one cannot see more than a few feet in any direction, the Bolivians chose to move bunched up in small patrols thru defiles and especially in stream beds where it was easier to walk. Thus they have been consistently ambushed by the guerrillas who prepared, camouflaged positions on the high ground on both sides of the defiles, and waited until they had fully entered the trap and then opened up on the Bolivian Army patrol from both sides with automatic weapons. Since the first few ambushes the patrols have started to maintain more distance between patrol members, but they are still prone to take the easy route through an area which leaves them ripe for an ambush.

Probably the greatest weakness in the anti-guerrilla effort of the Bolivian Army has been the fact that each year they take in all new soldiers and never before have they trained more than 4 hours a day. Also they have never before had to fight in the jungles where warfare is completely different. This plus the fact that they were up against a superior foe, one who was better armed and consisted of a hard corps of professionals, initially has made them putty in the hands of the guerrillas. Added to this is the fear which now exists in the minds of the Bolivian soldiers who consider the guerrillas to be ten feet tall and unbeatable. Initially, the only troops in the 4th Division area were all armed with old mauser rifles and approximately 70 percent of them did not fire because of broken firing pins or extractors. Also many of the troops initially combating the guerrillas had only fired 5 or 6 rounds from their weapons.

The Bolivian military because of their previous successes over the miners on the altiplano, were convinced that they had the capability of maintaining the internal security of their country. This they always did with MAP supported units against a very weak foe. When they suddenly realized that a small group of well-trained and equipped guerrillas could make fools out of them they became almost panicky.

The non-MAP supported units have never been properly equipped and all have old WW-I type weapons, no communications, and practically no transportation. Had the Bolivian Armed Forces over the past 9 years done

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their part to re-equip non-MAP supported units by now they would be capable of fielding a well equipped army of approximately 12,000 soldiers; instead they are still depending solely upon U.S. MAP supported units.

The new MAP supported 2d Ranger Battalion which is fully equipped with U.S. weapons and which began training under a U.S. Special Forces MTF on 1 May <sup>1967</sup> in the Santa Cruz area, should be ready for commitment sometime in September. This plus the proposal to arm and train several other non-MAP units in September and October with U.S. weapons and training should greatly enhance their capability to counter-act the guerrillas now in the CAMIRI-VALLE GRANDE area. If the guerrillas choose to remain in the Bolivian jungles they will ultimately be eliminated, but not until many months in the future; however, it is entirely possible and even probable that when the going gets too tough the guerrillas will separate on their own and cross into an adjacent country.

2. Paramilitary Forces - The only semi-paramilitary force in Bolivia is the Guardia Nacional de Seguridad Publica (Police), and their capability is limited to maintaining law and order within the cities and acting as a buffer between the miners and the Armed Forces for minor disturbances in the mining areas.

#### D. INTELLIGENCE:

##### 1. Penetration of Insurgency Forces -

a. In the guerrilla area the Bolivians' ability to penetrate the insurgents to gain intelligence has been non-existent.

b. In the cities, mines and other regions their ability to gain intelligence information concerning planned insurgency is fair and improving. Their biggest problem in this area is timely reporting of information partly because of poor communications.

2. Employment of Civil Populace - Practically not used although recently the Army G-2 has been trying to sell the idea of buying information concerning insurgent activity especially in the guerrilla area.

3. Communications - The Bolivian Army has a command net SSB between all ten divisions and the Army Headquarters in La Paz. The providing of GRC-9, PRC-10 and PRC-6 radios by the U.S. Army Mission gave the 4th Division a good

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over all communications capability in the CAMIRI area; however, the communications in the recently employed 8th Division are only fair. Except for the units in the guerrilla area and the MAP supported units communications from Division to regiments and on down are poor or non-existent. Communications in the Bolivian Navy are from poor to non-existent. The Bolivian Air Force now has a command net (KWM-2A radios) which is an excellent net with stations at CAMIRI, SANTA CRUZ, COCHABAMBA, RIBERALTA, TARIJA, EL ALTO and in the Air Force Headquarters in La Paz. The National Police depend on commercial communications or cooperation from the Army and the Air Force.

4. Adequacy to Supply Counterinsurgency Requirements - Absolutely terrible in the guerrilla area and poor to fair in other parts of Bolivia.

## E. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

Army - Poor

Air Force - Nil

Navy - Nil

Guardia Nacional - Poor

## F. CIVIC ACTION:

The Civic Action Program has been reasonably effective in the past and has helped to enhance the reputation of the Armed Forces especially in the country side. However, the program has slowed down this year because: 1) The U.S. is putting less money into the program and, 2) The program is divided between the Ministry of Economy and the Armed Forces. However, such projects as potable water to a small community and roads built by the Army Engineers into areas where there previously were no roads have been most helpful in assisting in the economic and social development of rural areas.

## G. POLITICAL ACTION:

### 1. Propaganda -

a. and b. The GOB has used radio broadcasts and newspaper articles to spread desired propaganda to the people. The Armed Forces also now have their own radio station in La Paz and President Barrientos holds weekly press conferences which are broadcast over the radio. The big problem in the opinion of the incumbent ARMA is the lack of central control

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for the dissemination of information to the public. What is needed is a central information center in the government and a central information center for the Armed Forces with close coordination between the two centers. As it is now each cabinet minister can be his own public information center, and the various military commanders in the field are also providing information to the public without coordination with higher headquarters. A well controlled and honest Public Information system for both the government and the Armed Forces would greatly enhance the public image of the GOB and the Armed Forces. At times the Armed Forces merely by a show of force in an area of unrest has stopped a subversive activity from getting off the ground.

2. Isolation Techniques to Deny Guerrillas Support - The Bolivian Armed Forces so far have been unable to isolate the guerrillas who are able to move almost at will within the large area where they are now operating. They have been able to move into small towns and villages at will and although they have forced the local populace to sell them food, medicines, clothes, etc., they have always paid high prices for what they took and have never molested the local populace. Isolation techniques were effectively used recently in the HUANUNI and CARAVI-SIGLO XX mine areas. The military cut all lines of communications and then moved in and took over the mines. Military control is still in effect and will be until the GOB is satisfied that the agitators are gone from the mines and that complete order and normal working conditions again prevail. Then after the troops have withdrawn the National Guard troops will be left to maintain law and order.

#### IV. (S) U.S. ROLE IN SUPPORT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT:

##### A. U.S. COUNTRY TEAM:

The U.S. Country Team in Bolivia is a well coordinated team with representation from all the key staff sections and including both Attaches and the USMILGP Commander. Under the guidance of the Ambassador we discuss in detail in advance the potential threats to the internal security of the country and how they can be met. In this country where the military is actually the only real base for stability the Attaches and the USMILGP Commander are extremely important to the Country Team effort. Coordination

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among the members of this Country Team is outstanding and we pool our resources to the good of the over-all United States effort. We do have political influence especially with President Barrientos who frequently invites the Ambassador, the DCM, the Attaches and the USMILGP Commander to his home for early morning breakfast to discuss current problems. Barrientos is a man who makes his own decisions and who at times lets loyalty over-rule good judgement, but he does listen to advice before deciding what he will do. The Director of USAID also has influence over some of the Ministers in the Cabinet and is able to help guide their efforts in the economical and fiscal areas.

## B. U.S. MILITARY FORCES:

The U.S. military forces in Bolivia consists of: 1) The Army and Air Force Attaches in the Defense Attache Office, and 2) The USMILGP which has an Army Section and an Air Force Section with an advisory and training mission. Frequently, the USMILGP has MTT's in country to assist in the training of the Bolivian Army and Air Force such as the MTT now training the 2d Ranger Battalion in Santa Cruz. The U.S. military personnel are not allowed to participate in the operational areas, however, the general staffs of both the Army and the Air Force seek advice constantly from the members of the USMILGP and the Attaches. There is a very close working relationship between the Bolivian military and the United States military.

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The Army Section of the USMILGP is located within the compound of the Army Headquarters and can work daily with the Army commander and his staff. The Air Force Section of the USMILGP is located in the same building as the Bolivian Air Force Headquarters. Thus the U.S. military members have a positive influence on the training and planning for the internal security of the GoB; however, we are never involved directly in internal security operations. The advisor depending upon his ability can definitely influence his counterpart, i.e., just this past week the Bolivian Army G-2 and G-3 asked ARMA if it would be possible for their advisors to have a desk in their section and work part time with them daily. The many

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mobile training teams have had positive influence in the training of the Bolivian officers and men. There have been several COIN courses, courses in riot control, a counterinsurgency course for key officers from all ten Army divisions, and currently we have the Special Forces MTT training the 2d Rangers in Santa Cruz and a 2-man MTT working with Ministry of Defense to assist in modernizing the planning and fiscal procedures. The United States Military Assistance Program (MAP) with its training and hardware is the main reason that the Bolivian Armed Forces have been successful in maintaining internal security. The Defense Budget has not in the past provided sufficient monies to the three services for them to properly maintain their equipment, i.e., until the current guerrilla emergency there was not sufficient money to buy tires, batteries, grease and even gasoline for vehicles. The basic problem in the over all effectiveness of the Armed Forces is that they have depended entirely on U.S. MAP support and have not purchased the necessary equipment for non-MAP units such as arms, communications equipment and transportation; in addition, they have not provided the necessary "soft goods" to keep the MAP equipment in first class condition. The U.S. Military Assistance Program is well planned and progressive and without it Bolivia would have gone down the drain. The Ministry of Defense controls the money to the nth degree except for the Air Force which is allowed to plan its own budget and utilize its monies as deemed appropriate by the Air Force Commander. The Army and the Navy commanders virtually have no control over the money allotted to their units. This is done at the Ministry of Defense level. Thus a fair haired Army unit commander in the eyes of the Minister of Defense may get much more financial support for his unit than another Army unit which actually needs far more. The Army Commander has the responsibility for maintaining the internal security of Bolivia but his hands are tied because he has no control over his logistical support except for that which he receives from our Military Assistance Program. It is hoped that the two man MTT now working in the Ministry of Defense will be able to help alleviate this bottle neck. The Bolivian military at all levels are easy to work with and most appreciative of our help. In the opinion of the ARMA the real bottle neck

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to progress has been lack of sufficient money, poor planning for how the monies would be used by the Ministry of Defense (especially by the Minister of Defense who has successfully maintained complete control over the monies for the Army and Navy). It is rumored that he will be replaced within the next two weeks and if this is true there is reason to hope for definite progress in the future.

## C. USIS:

The United States Information Service in Bolivia is really topnotch and has had a group of real professionals operating for the good of the Country Team effort. These people have been able to reach the Bolivians with their information and Bolivians from all walks of life. They have also materially helped the Attaches by providing us with books in Spanish which we give to Bolivian military friends and military schools. This has opened many doors for the incumbent ARMA and ultimately proved lucrative to our over-all mission. The United States influence has been substantial in Bolivia and our USIS has been a primary factor in this success.

## D. USAID:

Our USAID program in Bolivia is per capita one of the largest in the world and it has been professionally operated and controlled during my two plus years in Bolivia. The current director of USAID is one of the most capable and intelligent men whom I have ever known and he works closely with the Bolivians for the Internal Development of Bolivia. USAID in Bolivia is not a give away program. Before the GOB gets any money they must have an approved plan and agree to do their part in each proposed project. This has lead to better planning, mutual respect and more value received for every dollar utilized. USAID is primarily a loaning agency now to assist the GOB in such projects as transportation (road construction), water projects, education, electrical power projects, agriculture, mining and public safety. USAID has worked closely and effectively with the United States and Bolivian Armies concerning Civic Action projects. They have also worked with the Peace Corps and developed what we call a Community Development Program. This program has had a real impact on the

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small rural communities where Peace Corps workers with the self-help of the local populace and support from USAID have been able to help the people in the rural areas to help themselves by doing such things as constructing schools and dispensaries, developing potable water projects, and agricultural projects. USIS also works closely with USAID to make sure that the public is aware of what our aid is doing for the development of Bolivia.

**E. OTHER:**

The Peace Corps with approximately 350 young volunteers working and living with the people in almost every part of Bolivia have had a most important role in developing a respect for the United States especially among the illiterate populace in the rural and mining areas. However, their programs go far beyond community development, and have also even influenced the university students.

**V. (S) THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT:**

Argentina - Was allowed to establish a Naval Mission in Bolivia in early 1966. This mission is commanded by the Argentine Naval Attache and so far has provided only training support to the Bolivian Navy. Although their reason for coming to Bolivia was to teach the Bolivian Navy how to use the 11 boats that Argentina promised Bolivia in late 1965, to this date not one boat has been given to the Bolivian Navy by Argentina. Coordination with the U.S. missions is practically non-existent. The primary reason that Argentina wanted this naval mission in Bolivia was to gather intelligence for the government of Argentina. Although the Bolivian Navy knows that it has not received anything but training, its officers and men are influenced by the presence of the Argentine Mission.

Germany - Has no military programs and no attaches in Bolivia, but is one of the partners in the COMIBOL triangular plan. Germany has also recently sold Bolivia a several million dollar tin smelter which is to be constructed in ORURO. Germany does have favorable reputation and has influence in Bolivia.

Israel - Has several army officers in Bolivia organized as an

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agricultural team. This team is working with GOB to improve farming techniques. They have been beneficial to the GOB, and this has also provided Israel with a good intelligence source. There is minimal coordination between this team and the United States.

## VI. (S) AREAS IN NEED OF INCREASED EMPHASIS.

The major road block to modernizing the Bolivian Armed Forces is money and their present use of military manpower. As long as General OVANDO, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Defense believe that large numbers of soldiers are more important than a smaller force made up of effective well-trained and well-equipped units there will be no significant improvement in the Bolivian Armed Forces except when the U.S. provides training and equipment to MAP support additional units. If the Bolivian Army had maintained a smaller Army over the past several years and used the money saved, by not having to support several thousand additional and not required soldiers, to modernize and re-equip their non-MAP supported units, they would now have a professional and well-equipped army of at least 10,000 soldiers. Instead they have an Army of 15,000 men of which only about 5,000 are well equipped soldiers and all of these are in US MAP supported units. ARMA has convinced the Army Commander and his staff of the need for effective units and not a large number of poorly equipped men in uniform, but so far no one has been able to convince General OVANDO and the Minister of Defense of this key requirement for an effective Armed Forces.

Listed below are areas where increased emphasis is required:

1. Modernize the Defense Department and allow each service to prepare its annual budget requirements.
2. Sufficient money from the GOB to properly operate the Armed Forces.
3. Command supervision at all levels. (Orders are issued but seldom does anyone check to see if they are carried out.)
4. Establish a staggered two year period of service for conscripts to insure that a minimum of 50 percent of the conscripts in the Armed Forces at any time will have had at least one year of training.
5. Re-equip at least one non-MAP unit each year even if it means

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having a smaller Army.

6. Develop an intelligence system that functions at all levels in all three services and in the Ministry of Government. (At present an intelligence gathering capability is practically non-existent and this is a serious problem in the current guerrilla situation.)

7. Establish an effective system of debriefing patrols for intelligence information in the guerrilla area.

8. Establish an effective communication system from the division level down.

9. Utilize more time each day for training and improve training methods.

10. Stabilize officer assignments. (The Bolivians rotate too often from one position to another; in fact many officers change assignment every year).

11. Develop an Armed Forces General Staff that actually operates. (The current set-up is only an information gathering service for General OVANDO.)

12. Develop inter-service coordination and cooperation.

13. Assign strong leaders to command the 3 services. (The present Army and Air Force Commanders are fine gentlemen and intelligent, but are lacking in leadership.)

14. Develop a better logistical system.

15. Establish a system of command maintenance inspections of units, and provide units with the "soft goods" necessary to properly maintain their equipment.

16. Improve personnel assignments and use the U.S. and Panama school trained personnel in their specialties.

17. Establish a system for improving the morale of the military to include better and more military housing.

18. Develop, train, equip and modernize the National Police Force so that it can be an effective buffer between the people and the Armed Forces.

19. Establish a Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

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
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20. Develop a National Counterinsurgency plan.

21. Develop and publish detailed contingency plans in advance for possible problems which may develop within the country.

22. The President becomes too much involved with the Army during crisis such as the current guerrilla situation. (He should run the government and let the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces control the military problems).

23. Establish effective Public Information Centers at the government and Armed Forces level with close cooperation between the two centers. (In this manner the public image of the GOB and the Armed Forces could be greatly enhanced).

  
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